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Abstract
This paper studies a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem able to
ensure that the code used as the public key is no longer permutation-
equivalent to the secret code. This increases the security level of the
public key, thus opening the way for reconsidering the adoption of clas-
sical families of codes, like Reed-Solomon codes, that have been longly
excluded from the McEliece cryptosystem for security reasons. It is well
known that codes of these classes are able to yield a reduction in the key
size or, equivalently, an increased level of security against information set
decoding; so, these are the main advantages of the proposed solution. We
also describe possible vulnerabilities and attacks related to the considered
system, and show what design choices are best suited to avoid them.
Keywords : McEliece cryptosystem, Niederreiter cryptosystem, error correct-
ing codes, Reed-Solomon codes, public key security.
1 Introduction
The McEliece cryptosystem [31] is one of the most promising public-key cryp-
tosystems able to resist attacks based on quantum computers. In fact, differently
from cryptosystems exploiting integer factorization or discrete logarithms, it re-
lies on the hardness of decoding a linear block code without any visible structure
[9].
The material in this paper was presented in part at the Seventh International Workshop
on Coding and Cryptography (WCC 2011), Paris, France, April 2011. The Research was
supported in part by the Swiss National Science Foundation under grants No. 132256, 149716,
and in part by the MIUR project “ESCAPADE” (grant RBFR105NLC) under the “FIRB -
Futuro in Ricerca 2010” funding program.
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The original McEliece cryptosystem adopts the generator matrix of a binary
Goppa code as the private key, and exploits a dense transformation matrix and a
permutation matrix to disguise the secret key into the public one. It has resisted
cryptanalysis for more than thirty years, since no polynomial-time attack to the
system has been devised up to now; however, the increased computing power
and the availability of optimized attack procedures have required to update its
original parameters [11].
The main advantage of the McEliece cryptosystem consists in its fast encryp-
tion and decryption procedures, which require a significantly lower number of
operations with respect to alternative solutions (like RSA). However, the orig-
inal McEliece cryptosystem has two main disadvantages: low encryption rate
and large key size, both due to the binary Goppa codes it is based on. When
adopting Goppa codes, a first improvement is obtained through the variant pro-
posed by Niederreiter [35], which uses parity-check matrices instead of generator
matrices. A further reduction in the public key size can be obtained by replacing
binary Goppa codes with non-binary Goppa codes, and paying attention that
polynomial enumeration is prevented [13].
A significant improvement would be obtained if other families of codes could
be included in the system, allowing a more efficient code design and a more
compact representation of their matrices. In particular, the use of General-
ized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes could yield significant advantages. In fact,
GRS codes are maximum distance separable codes, which ensures they achieve
maximum error correction capability under bounded-distance decoding. In the
McEliece system, this translates into shorter keys for the same security level, or
a higher security level for the same key size, with respect to binary Goppa codes
(having the same code rate). In fact, Goppa codes are subfield subcodes of GRS
codes and the subcoding procedure makes them less efficient than GRS codes.
However, this also makes them secure against key recovering attacks, while
the algebraic structure of GRS codes, when exposed in the public key (also in
permuted form), makes them insecure against attacks aimed at recovering the
secret code, like the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack [46].
Many attempts of replacing Goppa codes with other families of codes have
exposed the system to security threats [38], [48], and some recent proposals
based on Quasi-Cyclic and Quasi-Dyadic codes have also been broken [47]. Low-
Density Parity-Check (LDPC) codes, in principle, could offer high design flexi-
bility and compact keys. However, also the use of LDPC codes may expose the
system to severe flaws [34, 5, 6, 36]. Nevertheless, it is still possible to exploit
Quasi-Cyclic LDPC codes to design a variant of the system that is immune to
any known attack [4, 2, 1, 3].
The idea in [4] is to replace the permutation matrix used in the original
McEliece cryptosystem with a denser transformation matrix. The transforma-
tion matrix used in [4] is a sparse matrix and its density must be chosen as a
trade-off between two opposite effects [1]: i) increasing the density of the public
code parity-check matrix, so that it is too difficult, for an opponent, to search
for low weight codewords in its dual code and ii) limiting the propagation of the
intentional errors, so that they are still correctable by the legitimate receiver.
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The advantage of replacing the permutation with a more general transformation
is that the code used as the public key is no longer permutation equivalent to
the secret code. This increases the security of the public key, as it prevents
an attacker from exploiting the permutation equivalence when trying to recover
the secret code structure.
We elaborate on this approach by introducing a more effective class of trans-
formation matrices and by generalizing their form also to the non-binary case.
The new proposal is based on the fact that there exist some classes of dense
transformation matrices that have a limited propagation effect on the inten-
tional error vectors. The use of these matrices allows to better disguise the
private key into the public one, with a controlled error propagation effect. So,
we propose a modified cryptosystem that can restore the use of advantageous
families of codes, like GRS codes, by ensuring increased public key security.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the
proposed system, both in the McEliece and Niederreiter versions. Design issues
are discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, a comparison with other variants of the
classic McEliece cryptosystem is developed. In Section 5, two kinds of attacks
are considered, namely the information set decoding attack and the attack based
on a particular kind of distinguisher able to tell the public matrices from random
ones. We will show that both these attacks can be avoided, by choosing proper
values of the parameters. In Section 6, key size and complexity are computed,
and then compared with other solutions. Finally, in Section 7, some conclusions
are drawn.
2 Description of the cryptosystem
The proposed cryptosystem takes as its basis the classical McEliece cryptosys-
tem, whose block scheme is reported in Fig. 1, where u denotes a cleartext
message and x its associated ciphertext. The main components of this system
are:
• A private linear block code generator matrix G
• A public linear block code generator matrix G′
• A secret scrambling matrix S
• A secret permutation matrix P
• A secret intentional error vector e
In the figure, Y−1 denotes the inverse of matrix Y.
As for the original system, the proposed cryptosystem can be implemented
in the classical McEliece form or, alternatively, in the Niederreiter version. In
both cases, the main element that differentiates the proposed solution from the
original cryptosystem is the replacement of the permutation matrix P with a
dense transformation matrix Q, whose design is described next.
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Figure 1: The original McEliece cryptosystem.
2.1 Matrix Q
The matrix Q is a non-singular n× n matrix having the form
Q = R+T, (1)
where R is a dense n× n matrix and T is a sparse n× n matrix. The matrices
R, T and Q have elements in Fq, with q ≥ 2.
The matrix R is obtained starting from two sets, A and B, each containing
w matrices having size z × n, z ≤ n, defined over Fq: A = {a1, a2, . . . , aw},
B = {b1,b2, . . . ,bw}. We also define a =
∑w
i=1 ai. The matrices in A and B
are secret and randomly chosen; then, R is obtained as:
R =


a1
a2
...
aw


T
·


b1
b2
...
bw

 , (2)
where T denotes transposition. Starting from (2), we make some simplifying
assumptions, aimed at reducing the amount of secret data that is needed to be
stored. In fact, for the instances of the proposed cryptosystem, we will focus
on two distinct cases, both with w = 2: i) a1 = a, a2 = 0 and ii) b2 = 1+ b1,
where 0 and 1 represent, respectively, the all-zero and the all-one z×n matrices.
In both these cases, the matrix R has rank z and there is no need to store nor
choose the matrix b2. For this reason, in order to simplify the notation, we
will replace b1 with b in the following. This obviously does not prevent the
applicability of the general form (2) of the matrix R.
Concerning the matrix T, it is obtained in the form of an n×n non-singular
sparse matrix having elements in Fq and average row and column weight equal
to m≪ n, where m is not necessarily an integer value. We provide more details
on its design in Section 2.4.
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In the system we propose, the matrix Q, having the form (1), replaces the
permutation matrix P that is used in the original McEliece cryptosystem and
in the Niederreiter version. All these systems exploit an intentional error vector
e = [e1, e2, . . . , en], randomly generated, having a predetermined weight tpub ≤
t, where t is the error correction capability of the secret code. In the original
McEliece and Niederreiter systems, tpub = t is used. In the system we propose,
we have instead tpub =
⌊
t
m
⌋
. Additionally, each error vector may be subject to
further constraints, as explained below.
Let us suppose that a constraint is imposed to the vector e in the form:
a · eT = 0. (3)
If we assume that the matrix a is full rank, the number of constraints we impose,
through (3), on the intentional error vectors is equal to z. Obviously, in order
to be implemented, this would require a to be disclosed as part of the public
key, and this, together with condition (3), may introduce a weakness in the
system. This issue will be discussed next, together with the ways to avoid such
a weakness.
For the moment, let us suppose that a is disclosed and that condition (3) is
verified. As we will see in the following, for both the McEliece and Niederreiter
versions of the cryptosystem it turns out that, during decryption, the matrix
Q has a multiplicative effect on the intentional error vector e. As a result, e is
transformed into e ·Q = e · (R+T). If (3) holds, for the two cases we focus
on, the contribution due to R becomes:
e ·R =
{
0, if a = a1, a2 = 0,
e · aT2 · 1, if b2 = 1+ b.
(4)
So, in the former case, e · Q reduces to e · T. In the latter case, instead, the
legitimate receiver should know the value of e · aT2 to remove the contribution
due to e ·R. We will see in the following how this can be done.
When the result of e ·Q can be reduced to e ·T, the use of the matrix Q as
in (1) allows to increase the number of intentional errors (at most) by a factor
m. For m = 1, the required error correction capability is exactly the same as in
the original McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems while, for m > 1, for the
same number of intentional errors, codes with higher error correction capability
are required. LDPC codes can be used for such purpose [4], [2].
The advantage of using the matrix Q is that it allows to disguise the private
matrix of a code over Fq in a way that can be much stronger than by using the
standard permutation matrix (as in the original McEliece system).
So, the proposed solution can help revitalizing previous attempts of using
alternative families of codes in the McEliece system. A first challenge is to
reconsider the usage of GRS codes over Fq. In the following sections we will
show that the attacks that have prevented their use in the past cannot be applied
to the new variant, so that it shall be considered secure against them.
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2.2 McEliece version
In the McEliece version of the proposed system, Bob chooses his secret key as
the k × n systematic generator matrix G of a linear block code over Fq, able
to correct t errors. He also chooses two further secret matrices: a k × k non-
singular scrambling matrix S and the n×n non-singular transformation matrix
Q, defined in (1). The public key is:
G′ = S−1 ·G ·Q−1. (5)
So, in general, differently from the original McEliece cryptosystem, the public
code is not permutation-equivalent to the private code.
Alice, after obtaining Bob’s public key, applies the following encryption map:
x = u ·G′ + e. (6)
After receiving x, Bob inverts the transformation as follows:
x′ = x ·Q = u · S−1 ·G+ e ·Q, (7)
thus obtaining a codeword of the secret code affected by the error vector e ·Q.
The special form we adopt for the matrix Q allows Bob to reduce e ·Q to
e ·T. Obviously, this is immediately verified when e ·R = 0 (former option in
(4)), while it will be shown in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 how it can be achieved when
e ·R 6= 0.
Bob is able to correct all the errors and get u ·S−1, thanks to the systematic
form of G. He can then obtain u through multiplication by S.
2.3 Niederreiter version
The Niederreiter version of the proposed cryptosystem works as follows. Bob
chooses the secret linear block code over Fq, able to correct t errors, by fixing
its r × n parity-check matrix (H), and obtains his public key as
H′ = S−1 ·H ·Q
T
, (8)
where the scrambling matrix S is a non-singular r × r matrix and the transfor-
mation matrix Q is defined as in (1).
Alice gets Bob’s public key, maps the cleartext vector into an error vector e
with weight tpub = ⌊
t
m⌋, and calculates the ciphertext as the syndrome x of e
through H′, according to
x = H′ · e
T
. (9)
In order to decrypt x, Bob first calculates x′ = S · x = H ·QT · eT =
H·(e ·Q)
T
. The special form of Q allows Bob to reduce e·Q to e·T. Obviously,
this is immediately verified when e ·R = 0, while it will be shown in Sections
3.2 and 3.3 how it can be achieved when e ·R 6= 0.
So, Bob gets H ·TT · eT and he is able to obtain eT = T
T · eT , having
weight ≤ t, by performing syndrome decoding through the private linear block
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code. Then, he multiplies the result by (TT )−1 and finally demaps e into its
associated cleartext vector u.
In order to reduce the public key size, the matrix H′, defined by (8), can
be put in systematic form. For this purpose, let us divide H′ into a left r × r
matrix H′l and a right r × k matrix H
′
r, i.e. H
′ = [H′l|H
′
r]. We can suppose,
without loss of generality, that H′l is full rank and obtain the systematic form
of H′ as:
H′′ = (H′l)
−1
·H′ =
[
I| (H′l)
−1
·H′r
]
= [I|H′′r] . (10)
If H′′ is used as the public key, only H′′r needs to be stored. When Alice uses
H′′ for encryption, she obtains a public message x′′ = H′′ · e
T
. Then, Bob must
use S′′ = S ·H′l, in the place of S, in order to compute x
′ = S′′ · x′′.
2.4 Design of T
As described in Section 2.1, the matrix T is an n×n non-singular sparse matrix
having elements in Fq and average row and column weight equal to m≪ n.
When m is an integer, T can be simply obtained as the sum ofm generalized
permutation matrices, with the only constraint that their non-null elements do
not overlap. When instead m is a rational value, a simple way to obtain T
would be to design an almost regular matrix, having only row and column
weights equal to ⌊m⌋ or ⌈m⌉, (where ⌊x⌋ and ⌈x⌉ denote the greatest integer
smaller than or equal to x and the smallest integer greater than or equal to x,
respectively). As an example, if m = 1.4, 40% of the rows and columns in T
could have weight equal to 2, while the remaining 60% of the rows and columns
could have weight equal to 1.
However, if we design T in this way, the system must tolerate some prob-
ability that the weight of e · T overcomes t, in which case decoding fails. By
considering again 1 < m < 2 (that will be the case of interest in the following),
it is easy to verify that this can happen when more than δt = t − tpub errors
occur at positions where T has weight-2 rows. If we consider that the selected
rows of T have disjoint supports, the failure probability Pf can be estimated
as:
Pf =
tpub∑
i=δt+1
(
tpub
i
)(
n−tpub
l−i
)
(
n
l
) , (11)
where l denotes the number of weight-2 rows. By taking into account the chance
of non-disjoint supports of the selected rows, the actual probability would result
in a slightly smaller value. To circumvent this problem, one of the following
solutions can be adopted:
1. Limit to δt the number of columns of T with weight > 1. If T has no more
than δt columns with weight> 1, some or all of the weight-2 rows ofT have
non-disjoint supports, and the weight of e · T is always ≤ t. Obviously,
such columns of T may have weight > ⌈m⌉ to reach the desired density.
This can be achieved by starting from a generalized permutation matrix
and then choosing δt columns at random and filling them at will. In this
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process, the number of rows with weight > 1 should be maximized, since
this is necessary to avoid attacks based on distinguishers, as we will see in
Section 5.1.2. Hence, the rows of T should still have weight ≤ ⌈m⌉.
2. Disclose the positions of the rows of T having weight = ⌈m⌉, for example
by putting them in the first part of the matrix. This way, intentional error
vectors having more than δt errors in those positions could be discarded.
This has the drawback to leak some information on the intentional error
vectors, which could reduce the complexity of decoding attacks.
3. Reduce tpub such that tpub <
⌊
t
m
⌋
and Pf becomes sufficiently small. This
way, however, the complexity of decoding attacks, which depends on the
number of intentional error vectors, is reduced as well.
Based on the above considerations, the first solution has to be preferred,
since it allows to fix tpub =
⌊
t
m
⌋
and does not affect the security level.
2.5 CCA2-secure conversions
The McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystem constructions described above, as
well as their original versions, offer one-way security under passive attacks, which
is a basic level of security for any public key cryptosystem.
However, in order to use these cryptosystems in practice, a stronger notion of
security should be achieved, that is, indistinguishability against adaptive chosen
ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2). For this purpose, several conversions of the
McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems have been proposed in the literature,
and they also apply to our case.
Classical CCA2-secure conversions work in the random oracle model [22,
28], while the problem of finding efficient CCA2-secure conversions of these
cryptosystem in the standard model has been addressed more recently [19, 18,
39, 42, 44]. The use of a CCA2-secure conversion also affects the public key size.
In fact, by adopting a classical CCA2-secure conversion in the random oracle
model [28], the public key size of the McEliece version can be reduced from k×n
to k×r symbols, since a public generator matrix in systematic form can be used.
The same unfortunately cannot be achieved with the CCA2-secure conversions
in the standard model currently available, which are still rather unpractical and
require larger public keys.
Nevertheless, using conversions which are CCA2-secure in the random oracle
model has allowed to achieve very efficient practical implementations of the
McEliece and Niederreiter systems [10]. On the other hand, as explained above,
the Niederreiter construction yields public keys of k× r symbols, both with and
without CCA2-secure conversion. Therefore, in Section 6 we will consider this
reduced amount of storage needed for the public key.
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3 System design
In this section, we describe some critical aspects and possible weaknesses that
must be carefully considered in the design of the proposed system.
3.1 Subcode vulnerability
When a = a1 and a2 = 0, a possible vulnerability results from condition
(3), since, in such a case, a subcode of the public code is exposed, that is
permutation-equivalent to a subcode of the private code. In fact, if we refer to
the Niederreiter version of the system, an attacker could consider the subcode
generated by the following parity-check matrix:
HS =
[
H′
a
]
=
[
S−1 ·H ·Q
T
a
]
=
[
S−1 ·H ·R
T
+ S−1 ·H ·T
T
a
]
. (12)
Each codeword c in the code defined by HS must verify a · c
T = 0. Due to
the form of R, this also implies RT · cT = 0, so HS defines a subcode of H
′ in
which all codewords satisfy S−1 ·H ·T
T
·cT = 0. Hence, the effect of the dense
R is removed and, when T is a permutation matrix (that is, when m = 1),
the subcode defined by HS is permutation-equivalent to a subcode of the secret
code. We notice that this is true both in the McEliece and Niederreiter versions
of the cryptosystem since the parity check matrix H′ can always be deduced
from the public generator matrix G′.
The same vulnerability can also occur when b2 = 1+b. In fact, in this case,
R =
[
a1
a2
]T
·
[
b
1+ b
]
= aT · b+ aT2 · 1 (13)
and
H ·RT = H · bT · a+H · 1T · a2. (14)
So, when the private code includes the all-one codeword, that is, H · 1T = 0,
it results H ·RT = H · bT · a and a vulnerable subcode is still defined by HS
as in (12). For this reason, when R is defined as in (13), codes including the
all-one codeword cannot be used as secret codes. For example, when a GRS
code defined over Fq and having length n = q − 1 is used, the all-one codeword
is always present. Shortened codes should be considered in order to avoid the
all-one codeword.
When a GRS code is used and one of its subcodes is exposed (except for a
permutation), an opponent could implement an attack of the type described in
[48]. It is possible to verify that, for practical choices of the system parameters,
the subcode defined by HS given by (12) is always weak against such an attack.
A similar situation occurs if LDPC codes are used as private codes, since low
weight codewords could be searched in the dual of the subcode defined by HS ,
so revealing some rows of H (though permuted) [5]. Moreover, the existence
of low weight codewords in the dual of a subcode of the public code could be
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dangerous for the system security even when HS is not available to an attacker,
since such codewords could still be searched in the dual of the public code.
So, when dealing with LDPC codes, it is always recommended to define T by
choosing m > 1, in order to avoid the existence of codewords with low weight
in the dual of the public code [4].
After having emphasized some potential weaknesses, in the following sub-
sections we propose two implementations of the cryptosystem that avoid the
subcode vulnerability. We describe them with reference to the Niederreiter ver-
sion of the cryptosystem, but they can also be applied to its McEliece version.
3.2 First implementation
A first solution to overcome the subcode vulnerability consists in maintaining
a1 = a and a2 = 0, but hiding the constraint vector a. Obviously, this also elim-
inates the need of selecting the intentional error vectors according to condition
(3).
We refer to the Niederreiter version of the cryptosystem and we fix, for
simplicity, z = 1, but the same arguments can be extended easily to the general
case 1 ≤ z ≤ n. Let us suppose that a is private and that the error vector e
generated by Alice is such that a · eT = γ, with γ ∈ Fq. It follows that
RT · eT = γbT (15)
and
x′ = S · x = γH · bT +H ·TT · eT . (16)
In this case, Bob can guess that the value of γ is γB and compute
x′′ = x′ − γBH · b
T
= (γ − γB)H · b
T +H ·TT · eT .
(17)
So, if γB = γ, Bob obtains x
′′ = H ·TT · eT . In such a case, he can recover
e through syndrome decoding, check its weight and verify that a · eT = γB.
Otherwise, it is γB 6= γ and, supposing that b is not a valid codeword, syndrome
decoding fails or returns an error vector e′ 6= e. The latter case is extremely
rare, as shown below, and can also be identified by Bob by checking the weight
of e′ and the value of a · e′T . So, by iterating the procedure, that is, changing
the value of γB, Bob is able to find the right γ.
The probability of finding a correctable syndrome e′, for γB 6= γ, is very
low. In fact, since b is randomly chosen, when γB 6= γ we can suppose that the
vector (γ − γB)H · b
T is a random r × 1 vector over Fq. The total number of
correctable syndromes is
∑t
i=1
(
n
i
)
(q − 1)
i
, while the total number of random
r × 1 vectors is qr. So, the probability of obtaining a correctable syndrome is:
Pe =
∑t
i=1
(
n
i
)
(q − 1)i
qr
. (18)
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The value of Pe, for practical choices of the system parameters, is very low, as
expected. For example, by considering the set of parameters used in the original
McEliece cryptosystem, that is, q = 2, n = 1024, k = 524, t = 50, it results in
Pe ≈ 10
−65.
To conclude this subsection, we notice that, by using such an implemen-
tation, the complexity of the decryption stage is increased, on average, by a
factor ≤ (q+1)/2 with respect to the classical Niederreiter implementation. In
fact, the average number of decryption attempts needed by Bob is (q + 1)/2.
However, some steps of the decryption procedure do not need to be repeated;
so, an increase in the decryption complexity by a factor (q + 1)/2 corresponds
to a pessimistic estimate.
3.3 Second implementation
A second solution to the subcode vulnerability is to adopt the choice a = a1+a2,
b2 = 1 + b and to preserve condition (3), that implies, for Alice, the need to
perform a selection of the error vectors. In this case, according to (4):
RT · eT = 1T · a2 · e
T . (19)
If we fix, for simplicity, z = 1 (but the same arguments can be extended
easily to the general case 1 ≤ z ≤ n) and suppose to work over Fq, the possible
values of α = a2 · e
T are, obviously, q. So, Bob needs to make up to q guesses
on the value of α.
First, Bob computes x′ = S ·x = H · (R +T)
T
·eT . By using (19), we have:
x′ = H · 1T · α+H ·TT · eT . (20)
We observe that, if the secret code included the all-one codeword, then H ·
1T = 0 and Bob would not need to guess the value of α. However, in this version
of the cryptosystem, the use of codes including the all-one codeword is prevented
by the subcode vulnerability, as discussed in Section 3.1; so, this facility cannot
be exploited. Instead, Bob needs to make a first guess by supposing α = αB
and to calculate
x′′αB = x
′ −H · 1T · αB = H · 1
T · (α− αB) +H ·T
T · eT . (21)
If αB = α, then x
′′
αB = H ·T
T · eT ; therefore, Bob can recover e through
syndrome decoding, check its weight and verify that a2 · e
T = αB . Otherwise,
the application of syndrome decoding on x′′αB results in a decoding failure or in
obtaining e′ 6= e, for αB 6= α. As for the first implementation, the probability
of obtaining a correctable syndrome e′ is very small; so, when αB 6= α, the
decoder will end up reporting failure in most cases.
Also in this case, the average number of decryption attempts needed by Bob
is (q + 1)/2, and the decryption complexity increases by a factor ≤ (q + 1)/2.
Concerning the subcode vulnerability, by using a1 6= a and a2 6= a, the
matrix HS as in (12) no longer defines a subcode permutation-equivalent to a
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subcode of the secret code. So, provided that the private code does not include
the all-one codeword (for the reasons explained in Section 3.1), the subcode
vulnerability is eliminated.
Note that an attacker could try to sum two rows of H′, hoping that one of
them corresponds to a copy of the vector a1 in R and the other to a copy of
the vector a2, so that the sum of the two rows might still contain the vector
a. If he were able to select only sums of this type, then he might be able to
find a weak subcode. This, however, appears to be a hard task for the following
reasons. If he adds one row with all the other rows, he would get, on average,
only r/2 = (n− k)/2 rows containing the vector a, while the other sums would
contain 2a1 or 2a2; even if he were able to select the rows corresponding to a, the
dimension of the subcode would not be large enough for a feasible attack [32],
[48]. Furthermore, effectively obtaining a in the sum of two rows also depends
on how H is built, i.e. it may happen only if some special relations between
elements of H are satisfied. Again, this has only a (small) probability to occur.
Lastly, summing pairs of rows would also imply summing pairs of rows ofTT ; so,
their (very low) weight would be doubled with a very high probability, making
decoding harder.
For these reasons, it seems not easy to devise a further vulnerability for the
subcode that may allow to mount an attack against this implementation.
3.4 Choice of Q
Also the choice of the matrix Q can involve some critical aspects. Let us fo-
cus on the binary case (q = 2) and consider a particular instance of the first
implementation, in which the matrix Q is obtained as
Q1 = R+P1, (22)
P1 being a permutation matrix and
R = aT · b =
[
a1 a2 · · · an
]T
·
[
b1 b2 · · · bn
]
, (23)
where a and b are two random vectors over F2.
In the choice of Q1, it is important to avoid some special cases which could
allow an attacker to derive a code that is permutation-equivalent to the secret
one, thus bringing security back to that of the classical McEliece system.
For exploring the subject, let us suppose that the j-th element of b is zero
and that P1 has a symbol 1 at position (i, j). In this case, the j-th column of
Q1 is null, except for its element at position i. Since Q
−1
1 = Q̂1/ |Q1|, where
Q̂1 is the adjoint matrix and |Q1| is the determinant of Q1, it follows from the
definition of Q̂1 that the i-th column of Q
−1
1 is null, except for its element at
position j. So, the i-th column of Q−11 has the effect of a column permutation,
like in the original McEliece cryptosystem.
In order to avoid such a possible flaw, we impose that all the elements of b
are non-zero. If we limit to the binary case, this imposes that b is the all-one
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vector. However, in such a case, further issues exist in the design of Q. For
example, let us consider a as an all-one vector too, so that R = 1. A valid
parity-check matrix for the public code is:
H′ = H ·QT , (24)
where H is the parity-check matrix of the private code. In the special case of
Q1 = 1+P1, we have H
′ = H · 1+H ·PT1 . By assuming a regular H (i.e. with
constant row and column weights), two cases are possible:
• If the rows of H have even weight, H · 1 = 0 and H′ = H ·PT1 .
• If the rows of H have odd weight, H · 1 = 1 and H′ = 1+H ·PT1 .
In both cases, the public code has a parity-check matrix that is simply a per-
muted version of that of the secret code (or its complementary). This reduces
the security to that of the original McEliece cryptosystem, that discloses a per-
muted version of the secret code. Such a security level is not sufficient when
adopting, for example, LDPC codes, since the permuted version of the secret
matrix H can be attacked by searching for low weight codewords in the dual of
the secret code.
A more general formulation of the flaw follows from the consideration that
Q1 = 1+P1 has a very special inverse. First of all, let us consider that Q1 is
invertible only when it has even size. This is obvious since, for odd size, Q1 has
even row/column weight; so, the sum of all its rows is the zero vector. If we
restrict ourselves to even size Q1 matrices, it is easy to show that their inverse
has the form Q−11 = 1+ P
T
1 , due to the property of permutation matrices (as
orthogonal matrices) to have their inverse coincident with the transpose.
So, Q−11 has the same form of Q1 and, as in the case of H, disclosing G
′ =
S−1GQ−11 might imply disclosing a generator matrix of a permuted version
of the secret code or its complementary (depending on the parity of its row
weight). Therefore, the form Q1 = 1+P1 might reduce the security to that of
the permutation used in the original McEliece cryptosystem.
Based on these considerations, one could think that adopting a vector a
different from the all-one vector could avoid the flaw. However, by considering
again that Q−11 = Q̂1/ |Q1|, it is easy to verify that a weight-1 row in Q1
produces a weight-1 row in Q−11 and a weight-(n − 1) row in Q1 produces a
weight-(n − 1) row in Q−11 . It follows that Q
−1
1 contains couples of columns
having Hamming distance 2. Since their sum is a weight-2 vector, the sum
of the corresponding columns of the public matrix results in the sum of two
columns of S−1G. Starting from this fact, an attacker could try to solve a
system of linear equations with the aim of obtaining a permutation-equivalent
representation of the secret code, at least for the existing distance-2 column
pairs.
So, our conclusion concerning the binary case is that the choice of Q as in
(22) and (23) should be avoided. A safer Q is obtained by considering z > 1
and m > 1. This obviously has the drawback of requiring codes with increased
error correction capability.
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These considerations about the structure of the matrix Q are useful in gen-
eral for every family of codes we would like to use in the proposed system,
but a more specific characterization is needed depending on the type of codes
adopted. In fact, in order to avoid specific attacks or to choose feasible param-
eters linked to the code’s error correction capability, it is necessary to address
further structure issues like those we will analyze in Section 5.1.
4 Comparison with other variants of the McEliece
cryptosystem
The main difference between the proposed cryptosystem and many other vari-
ants of the McEliece cryptosystem consists in the way the secret generator
matrix is disguised into the public one, that is, by using a more general trans-
formation matrix in the place of the permutation matrix.
Other proposals for increasing key security have been made in the past, such
as using a distortion matrix together with rank codes in the GPT cryptosystem
[23] and exploiting the properties of subcodes in variants of the McEliece and
the GPT cryptosystems [8]. Unfortunately, cryptanalysis has shown that such
approaches exhibit security flaws [38], [48].
The idea of using a rank-1 matrix with the structure (23) can be found
in [24]. However, such a matrix was added to the secret matrix (rather than
multiplied by it) and no selection of the error vectors was performed, so that a
completely different solution was implemented.
Instead, the idea of replacing the permutation in the McEliece cryptosystem
with a more general transformation matrix is already present in the variant of
the GPT cryptosystem adopting a column scrambler [37], [43] and in cryptosys-
tems based on full decoding [27, sec. 8.3]. These proposals are shortly examined
next.
4.1 Comparison with the modified GPT cryptosystem
The original GPT cryptosystem has been the object of Gibson’s attack. To
counter such an attack, in [37] a variant including a column scrambler in place
of the permutation matrix has been proposed.
Apart from the code extension and the inclusion of an additive distortion ma-
trix, in the modified GPT cryptosystem the public generator matrix is obtained
through right-multiplication by a non-singular matrix that is not necessarily a
permutation matrix. So, in principle, it seems the same idea of using a more
general transformation matrix as in the proposed cryptosystem. However, in
order to preserve the ability to correct the intentional error vectors, the GPT
cryptosystem works in the rank metric domain and adopts rank distance codes,
like Gabidulin codes.
Unfortunately, the properties of Gabidulin codes make it possible to exploit
the effect of the Frobenius automorphism on the public generator matrix in order
to mount a polynomial-time attack [38]. Recently, it has been shown that this
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attack can be avoided [43], but the cryptosystem still needs to work with rank
distance codes. Differently from the GPT cryptosystem, the proposed solution is
able to exploit Hamming distance codes, that: i) are more widespread than rank
distance codes, ii) can be chosen to have convenient properties or structure, like
GRS codes, and iii) may take advantage of many efficient codec implementations
that are already available.
4.2 Comparison with full-decoding cryptosystems
The main idea behind full-decoding cryptosystems in [27] is to let the intentional
error vectors have any arbitrary weight. This way, an attacker would be forced
to try full-decoding of the public code, that is known to be an NP-complete task.
Obviously, the legitimate receiver must be able to decode any intentional error
vector with reasonable complexity; so, the problem of full decoding must be
transformed from a one-way function to a trapdoor function. For this purpose,
the main idea is to use a transformation that maps a set of error vectors with
weight ≤ t into a set of arbitrary weight intentional error vectors.
If this transformation is represented by the n×n matrixM, the public code
(as proposed first in [27]) would be G′ = G ·M. The basic point for obtaining
a trapdoor function is to make Alice use only those error vectors that can be
expressed as e′ = e ·M, where e is a weight-t error vector. This way, when Bob
uses the inverse of the secret matrixM to invert the transformation, he re-maps
each arbitrary weight error vector into a correctable error vector. Unauthorized
users would instead be forced to try full-decoding over arbitrary weight error
vectors; so, the trapdoor is obtained.
The set of intentional error vectors used in full-decoding cryptosystems is
not the set (or a subset) of the correctable error vectors, as in the proposed
cryptosystem, but a transformed version of it. In fact, the purpose of full-
decoding cryptosystems is to increase the security level with respect to the
McEliece cryptosystem by relying on a problem that is harder to solve. In
order to exploit the full-decoding problem, Alice must use for encryption only
those error vectors that can be anti-transformed into correctable error vectors.
So, some information on the transformation used to originate them must be
disclosed. A solution is that the first p < n rows of M are made public [27].
However, it has been proved that, this way, the security reduces to that of
the original McEliece cryptosystem, and an attacker does not have to attempt
full-decoding, but only normal decoding.
Further variants aim at better hiding the secret transformation matrix in
its disclosed version [27]. In the last variant, a generator matrix of a maximum
distance-t anticode is used to hide the secret transformation. This way, after
inverting the secret transformation, the error vector remains correctable for the
legitimate receiver. To our knowledge, the latter version has never been proved
to be insecure nor to reduce to the same problem of the original McEliece
cryptosystem. However, the construction based on anticodes seems unpractical.
Differently from full-decoding cryptosystems, our proposal still relies on the
same problem as the original McEliece cryptosystem (that is, normal decoding);
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so, no transformation is performed over the correctable random error vectors,
but we need, at most, only a selection of them. For this reason, the information
leakage on the secret transformation matrix that is needed in the proposed cryp-
tosystem is considerably smaller with respect to what happens in full-decoding
cryptosystems.
5 Attacks against the proposed cryptosystem
A first concern about the proposed cryptosystem is to verify that it is actually
able to provide increased key security, with respect to previous variants of the
McEliece cryptosystem, in such a way as to allow the use of widespread families
of codes (like GRS codes) without incurring in the attacks that have prevented
their use up to now.
From the comparison with the variants described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2,
we infer that previous attacks targeted to those cryptosystems do not succeed
against the proposed one, due to the differences in the family of codes used and
in the information leakage on the secret transformation. Concerning the latter
point, we observe that, even if the whole matrix R (and not only the vector a)
were public, an attacker would not gain much information. In fact, in this case,
he could compute x ·R = u ·G′ ·R. However, for the choices of the parameters
we consider, R has rank≪ n, so G′ ·R is not invertible and recovering u is not
possible.
The most general attack procedures against code-based cryptosystems, hence
against our proposed solution, are those techniques that attempt information
set decoding (ISD) on the public code; so we estimate the security level of
the proposed cryptosystem against this kind of attacks. Actually, there is no
guarantee that the public code, defined through the generator matrix (5) or,
equivalently, the parity-check matrix (8), maintains the same minimum distance
and error correction capability of the secret code. Since the private code has very
good distance properties, and the transformation matrix is randomly chosen, the
public code will most probably have worse minimum distance than the private
one. So, in estimating the security level as the work factor (WF) of ISD attacks,
we make the pessimistic assumption that the public code is still able to correct
all intentional errors.
More specific attack techniques are those aimed at exploiting the particular
structure of the adopted codes. In this case, a necessary condition to perform
the attack is the ability to distinguish the public code matrix from a random
matrix. If the attacker cannot distinguish the complete random case from the
implemented one, he is forced to use ISD attack procedures in place of specific
ones. Various distinguisher techniques are used against specific codes: a notable
one is that presented in [21]; in this case the authors propose a polynomial
algorithm to distinguish high rate alternant codes (Goppa codes are alternant
codes) from random codes. Since the existence of a distinguisher attack would be
more effective than ISD attacks, we discuss this issue first, in the next subsection.
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5.1 Distinguisher attacks
We will analyze two possible kinds of distinguisher for the case of GRS codes
adopted as secret codes. The first one is that proposed in [21], that is able
to distinguish matrices in the classic Goppa code-based McEliece cryptosystem
and CFS signature scheme [16], for certain system parameters. The second one
derives from [25, 17], where the authors focus just on the GRS codes. Both of
them do not succeed in breaking the system we propose in its general version,
but, as often happens when dealing with distinguisher attacks, the second one
forces a particular choice of the system parameters, in the same manner as the
first one forces certain parameters for Goppa codes. We notice that a distin-
guisher, able to discriminate between a random matrix and the generator (or
parity check) matrix of the public code, gives a clue regarding some possible
vulnerabilities but does not define an attack procedure, in strict sense. How-
ever, in the particular case of GRS based matrices, it is possible to derive an
attack on the basis of a modified distinguisher [25, 17]. Before introducing the
attack, we remark that, since the dual space of a GRS code is still a GRS code,
the parity check matrix of a GRS code is still a generator matrix of a GRS code
having dimension and redundancy inverted with respect to the first one. This
implies that the following procedure can be applied both to the McEliece and
Niederreiter versions of the system. For the sake of clarity, we will refer to G
as a generic GRS generator matrix, also in accordance with the notation used
in [25].
We define a Distinguisher Attack Procedure (DAP) through:
• the public code Cpub described by the public key matrix G
′
• the code C whose generator matrix is G ·T−1
• the matrix R ·T−1 = B′T ·A′, having rank equal to z
• the matrix P = I+R ·T−1, where I is the identity matrix
• the matrix Λ = P−1 ·B′T
• the code CΛ⊥ = C∩ < Λ >
⊥, where < Λ >⊥ is the space having Λ as
parity check matrix.
A′ and B′ are n×z matrices, whose existence is ensured by setting Q = R+T.
It is possible to show that CΛ⊥ is a large subspace of both Cpub and C. So, in the
case of m = 1, CΛ⊥ is a large subspace of a permuted version of the secret code.
Knowing this subspace could allow the attacker to use the algorithm introduced
in [48] for recovering the secret code, once he has recovered the description of
CΛ⊥ as GRS code, using the algorithm presented in [46]. If the attacker is able
to distinguish between the vectors belonging to Cpub, but not to CΛ⊥ , and those
belonging to Cpub and to CΛ⊥ he could hence recover the secret key.
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5.1.1 Alternant distinguisher
The idea behind [21] is to consider the dimension of the solution space of a linear
system deduced from the polynomial system describing the alternant (Goppa)
code by a linearization technique which introduces many unknowns. The so-
lution of this linearized system is indeed an algebraic attack against particular
instances of the McEliece cryptosystem (those having very structured matrices
like quasi-cyclic or quasi-dyadic codes, that allow to reduce the complexity of
the linearized system). However this attack is not feasible in the general case,
that is the case of classic Goppa codes with no further structure.
The authors propose not to solve the system, but rather to consider the
dimension of its solution space in such a way as to distinguish systems induced
from an alternant code, a Goppa code or a random one. However, this distin-
guisher is ineffective against the system we propose, since:
• it is not able to distinguish the public key matrix of the proposed cryp-
tosystem from a randomly generated one, that is, our keys are resistant
to this distinguisher since they are not generator matrices of alternant or
GRS codes (this is due to the fact that Q is not a permutation matrix);
• it does not allow to mount a DAP: the distinguisher cannot work on
subspaces of the code, so it is unable to recover the subspace the attacker
needs.
5.1.2 GRS code-based distinguisher
Let us denote by ⋆ the so-called star product [29]. Given a = [a1, a2, . . . , an]
and b = [b1, b2, . . . , bn], we have a ⋆ b = [a1b1, a2b2, . . . , anbn]. Using this star-
product on the elements of the public code, another distinguisher was devised in
[25, 17], specifically designed to obtain a subcode needed to attack the system
through a DAP.
The key idea is to choose 3 random codewords c1, c2, c3 of the code described
by the public generator matrix and compute all the possible star products gi⋆cj,
where gi is one of the rows in G
′, with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ 3.
It is possible to verify that, if {c1, c2, c3} ∈ CΛ⊥ , the dimension of the space
described by G′ ⋆{c1, c2, c3} is almost always equal to (or very close to) 2k+2;
otherwise, when at least one cj /∈ CΛ⊥ , the dimension is equal to (or very close
to) 3k − 3. For the sake of simplicity, we call DΛ and Drand the dimension of
the distinguisher space in the two cases. We note that the DAP in [25, 17] can
be applied to a code having rate < 0.5 or to its dual if the rate is > 0.5; so, k
has to be replaced by r = n− k for the cases we consider, where the rates are
greater than 0.5.
Actually, by assuming z = 1 and m = 1 the complexity of the distinguisher
phase of the attack, hence not considering the subsequent subcode recovering
phase and the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack, is O(nk2q3), where q is the cardinal-
ity of the field; so, it seems feasible for any reasonable choice of the parameters.
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Based on this fact, in [25] it has been demonstrated that a DAP is feasible
when z = 1 and m = 1. This is obviously a very particular choice. In the
following, instead, we will consider more general cases with z > 1 and m > 1:
one or both of these choices make the system immune to this kind of attacks. In
fact, two possible countermeasures to this DAP can be devised, both based on
an increase of z and/or m; the first one imposes to increase the decoding com-
plexity, while the second one comes for free, but requires good error correction
capabilities.
The probability to find, in a single attempt, a set of three vectors belonging
to CΛ⊥ is
1
q3z . This means that increasing z yields a large increase in the
distinguisher phase work factor. Another strategy, that allows to avoid the
DAP regardless of its work factor, is to increase the value of m. In fact, we
have verified numerically that increasing from 1 to 2 the weight of a single row
of matrix T has the effect of increasing also DΛ by the same quantity. We have
verified that this effect remains even when the weight-2 rows of T have one of
the two non-zero symbols concentrated in a small number of columns, which is
a desirable feature in the design of T, as explained in Section 2.4.
When DΛ = Drand, the distinguisher fails, since there is no dimension
difference between the space the attacker needs to mount the DAP and the
public key space. The condition DΛ = Drand can be achieved by adding
3r − 3 − (2r + 2) = r − 5 non-null elements to the matrix T. In turn, this
can be accomplished by setting m ≥ 1 + r−5n . On the other hand, in [25]
the authors notice a non-negligible probability that DΛ is slightly smaller than
its expected value; so, it can be useful to increase the value of m such that
m ≥ 1 + r−3n . Actually, this is only a precautionary condition, since, in all our
tests, the defect in DΛ or in Drand was never noticed.
Let t = tGRS be the correction capability of the secret GRS code, and
tpub = ⌊
t
m⌋ the number of intentional errors in the encrypted message (for the
McEliece version) or the number of errors generating the transmitted syndrome
(in the Niederreiter version).
The choice of m > 1, which is needed to avoid attacks based on distin-
guishers, affects the WF of the ISD attack techniques that will be presented
in Section 5.2, since, for a fixed error correction capability of the private code,
the number of intentional errors to be added during encryption decreases as m
increases over 1.
5.2 ISD attacks
The ISD attack is non-polynomial in the code dimension, since it aims at de-
coding a random linear code without exploiting any structural property (even
if present) and this task is notoriously non-polynomial.
The complexity of ISD algorithms depends on the actual number of errors
added to a codeword (besides the cardinality of the field, the code length and
dimension), and not on the code correction capability; so, it is crucial to assess
the number of errors the algorithm is searching for. For such reason, we in-
vestigate whether the constraints that may be imposed on the intentional error
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vectors in the proposed cryptosystem have any consequences on its security. For
this purpose, the approach we adopt consists in considering a reduced number
of intentional errors in the WF computations, that is, t′pub = tpub − z. This
approach is conservative in the sense that we assume that the attacker exactly
knows both the position and the value of z errors, while he actually knows only
their values.
In [11] the authors propose some smart speedup techniques to reduce the
work factor of Stern’s algorithm for ISD over the binary field, this way obtaining
a theoretical WF close to 260 for the original set of parameters (n = 1024,
k = 524, t = 50). As a consequence, the authors consider some new set of
system parameters in order to increase the security level. One of the biggest
improvements presented in [11] is a smart way to find k independent columns
in the public generator matrix at each iteration without performing Gaussian
reduction on all such columns. A further improvement consists in the pre-
computation of the sum of some rows during the reduction.
In [40], the algorithm is generalized to work over larger fields, and it is shown
that the speedups introduced in [11] are mostly efficient on very small fields. As
it can be argued from the table available in [41], for q > 16 the maximum values
of the speedup parameters are c = 2, s = 1, where c represents the number
of columns to be changed in the case an iteration fails and s is the number
of rows in a single pre-sum (1 means no speedup). So, for large fields, these
speedups are not relevant and the algorithm is quite similar to Stern’s one. The
difference relies on guessing not only p error positions but also p error values in
the k independent columns, due to the field cardinality.
Concerning ISD over the binary field, several advances have recently ap-
peared in the literature [30, 12, 7], which are able to reduce the attack work
factor. Non-asymptotic estimates of the work factor of the most recent algo-
rithm [7] are reported in [33, 26]. Unfortunately, there is no straightforward
generalization of this algorithm to work over non-binary fields. Therefore, we
adopt a heuristic and conservative approach to take into account the possible
improvement coming from its generalization to non-binary fields. It relies on
the following observations:
• For a fixed set of parameters (code length and rate, and number of errors
to correct), the work factor of the algorithm in [40] is moderately affected
by the field size. For example, for codes with (n, k) as in Table 3, z = 1,
and a number of errors equal to tpub − 1, passing from F547 to F2 gives
a maximum reduction of the work factor in the order of 210. The same
holds for codes with the parameters in Table 4, passing from F347 to F2.
This conclusion results from Tables 1 and 2, where we report the values of
the ISD work factor computed according to [40] for these two sets of code
parameters, as a function of the number of errors and the field size. Such
values of work factor have been computed through the PARI/GP script
available in [41].
• By considering the most recent ISD variant [7] and estimating its work
factor as in [33], we obtain that, for the binary case, a work factor re-
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duction in the order of 29 or less results with respect to the approach in
[40], when codes with the parameters in Tables 3 and 4 are considered.
This also results from Tables 1 and 2, where we report the values of the
ISD work factor computed according to [7, 33], for the binary case, as a
function of the number of errors.
Based on these considerations, we assume that, if a generalization of the algo-
rithm in [7] to non-binary fields were found, it would result in a work factor
reduction in the order of 29 or less with respect to the algorithm in [40], for the
parameters we consider.
Table 1: Work factor (log2) of ISD attacks on GRS codes with n = 546, defined
over several finite fields, for m = 1 + r−3n and z = 1.
k 428 420 412 404 396 388 380 372 364 356 348 340 332 324
tpub 48 51 54 56 59 61 63 66 68 70 72 75 77 79
WFz=1(F547) [40] 131.1 133.8 136.1 135.7 137.6 136.9 136.2 137.5 136.6 135.5 134.4 135.1 133.8 132.4
WFz=1(F256) [40] 130.4 132.9 135.1 134.6 136.4 135.7 134.9 136.1 135.1 134.0 132.9 133.4 132.1 130.6
WFz=1(F128) [40] 128.5 131.1 133.3 132.8 134.6 133.9 133.1 134.3 133.3 132.3 131.1 131.6 130.3 128.8
WFz=1(F64) [40] 126.9 129.4 131.6 131.1 132.9 132.2 131.4 132.6 131.6 130.5 129.4 129.9 128.6 127.1
WFz=1(F32) [40] 125.2 127.7 130.0 129.5 131.3 130.6 129.8 131.0 130.0 129.0 127.8 128.4 127.0 125.6
WFz=1(F16) [40] 123.7 126.3 128.5 128.1 129.9 129.2 128.4 129.7 128.7 127.7 126.5 127.1 125.8 124.4
WFz=1(F2) [40] 123.4 125.9 128.1 127.4 129.2 128.3 127.3 128.6 127.4 126.2 124.9 125.5 124.0 122.5
WFz=1(F2) [7, 33] 115.2 117.6 119.8 119.3 121.0 120.1 119.1 120.2 119.0 117.8 116.4 116.9 115.4 114.0
Table 2: Work factor (log2) of ISD attacks on GRS codes with n = 346, defined
over several finite fields, for m = 1 + r−3n and z = 1.
k 284 276 268 260 252 244 236 228 220 212 204 196 188 180 172
tpub 26 29 32 34 37 39 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58
WFz=1(F347) [40] 82.4 85.9 88.8 88.8 90.9 90.5 92.0 91.1 90.2 89.1 87.9 86.6 85.1 83.6 82.0
WFz=1(F256) [40] 82.3 85.8 88.7 88.7 90.8 90.4 91.9 91.0 90.1 89.0 87.8 86.5 85.1 83.5 81.9
WFz=1(F128) [40] 81.9 85.2 87.9 87.8 89.8 89.2 90.6 89.6 88.6 87.4 86.2 84.8 83.3 81.6 79.9
WFz=1(F64) [40] 80.3 83.6 86.3 86.2 88.2 87.7 89.0 88.1 87.0 85.9 84.6 83.2 81.7 80.0 78.3
WFz=1(F32) [40] 78.4 81.6 84.4 84.3 86.3 85.7 87.1 86.2 85.1 84.0 82.7 81.3 79.9 78.3 76.6
WFz=1(F16) [40] 76.9 80.2 83.0 82.8 84.9 84.3 85.7 84.8 83.8 82.7 81.5 80.2 78.8 77.3 75.7
WFz=1(F2) [40] 74.9 75.2 81.6 81.2 83.2 82.4 83.8 82.8 81.6 80.3 79.0 77.6 76.0 74.4 72.6
WFz=1(F2) [7, 33] 68.2 71.6 74.2 73.7 75.6 74.8 76.0 74.9 73.7 72.4 70.9 69.4 68.2 66.2 64.5
5.3 Numerical examples
In Tables 3 and 4 we report some values of the ISD attack WF, when using GRS
codes in the variant of the McEliece cryptosystem we propose, with m = 1+ r−3n
and z = 1, 2, 3, 4. They were computed through the PARI/GP script available
in [41], that allows the estimation of the security level based on the algorithm in
[40]. The reported WFs are the lowest ones obtained for each set of parameters.
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Table 3: Work factor (log2) of ISD attacks estimated as in [40] for GRS codes
with n = 546, defined over F547, and m = 1 +
r−3
n , z = 1, 2, 3, 4.
k 428 420 412 404 396 388 380 372 364 356 348 340 332 324
tGRS 59 63 67 71 75 79 83 87 91 95 99 103 107 111
m 1.211 1.225 1.240 1.255 1.269 1.284 1.299 1.313 1.328 1.342 1.357 1.372 1.386 1.401
tpub 48 51 54 56 59 61 63 66 68 70 72 75 77 79
WFz=1 131.1 133.8 136.1 135.7 137.6 136.9 136.2 137.5 136.6 135.5 134.4 135.1 133.8 132.4
WFz=2 128.4 131.1 133.5 133.3 135.2 134.7 134.0 135.4 134.5 133.6 132.6 133.3 132.0 130.7
WFz=3 125.7 128.5 131.0 130.8 132.9 132.4 131.9 133.3 132.5 131.7 130.7 131.5 130.3 129.1
WFz=4 123.0 125.9 128.5 128.4 130.6 130.2 129.7 131.3 130.6 129.8 128.9 129.7 128.6 127.4
Table 4: Work factor (log2) of ISD attacks estimated as in [40] for GRS codes
with n = 346, defined over F347, and m = 1 +
r−3
n , z = 1, 2, 3, 4.
k 284 276 268 260 252 244 236 228 220 212 204 196 188 180
tGRS 31 35 39 43 47 51 55 59 63 67 71 75 79 83
m 1.171 1.194 1.217 1.240 1.263 1.286 1.309 1.332 1.355 1.379 1.402 1.425 1.448 1.471
tpub 26 29 32 34 37 39 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56
WFz=1 82.4 85.9 88.8 88.8 90.9 90.5 92.0 91.1 90.2 89.1 87.9 86.6 85.1 83.6
WFz=2 79.4 83.1 86.2 86.3 88.6 88.3 89.9 89.2 88.3 87.4 86.3 85.1 83.7 82.3
WFz=3 76.4 80.3 83.6 83.9 86.3 86.1 87.9 87.3 86.5 85.7 84.7 83.6 82.3 80.9
WFz=4 73.5 77.6 81.0 81.5 84.0 84.0 85.8 85.4 84.7 84.0 83.1 82.1 80.9 79.6
Based on Tables 3 and 4, we can compare the proposed cryptosystem with
some instances of the McEliece/Niederreiter system based on Goppa codes. Two
examples are selected below.
5.3.1 Example 1
To reach WF ≥ 280, the (1632, 1269) binary Goppa code is suggested in [11],
resulting in a public-key size of 460647 bits (obtained by storing only k · r bits
of H or G). With the new variant, we can consider from Table 4 the GRS code
with n = 346, k = 252, tGRS = 47 over F347, having an estimated WF of 2
90.9
binary operations with z = 1. Hence, its security level remains higher than 280
even when considering the improvement estimated in Section 5.2 for possible
advances in ISD algorithms over non-binary fields.
Since we choose m = 1+ r−3n , the distinguisher attack is avoided even when
z = 1, and the weight of the intentional error vector is tpub = 37. This way, by
adopting the first implementation (see Section 3.2), we obtain a public key size
of 199899 bits, that is about 57% less than in the revised McEliece/Niederreiter
cryptosystem [11]. If we instead adopt the second implementation (see Section
3.3), we also need to store the 1× 346 vector a, with elements over F347. This
would increase the public key size by 2920 bits, that is not a significant change.
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5.3.2 Example 2
To reach WF ≥ 2128, the (2960, 2288) binary Goppa code is suggested in [11],
resulting in a public-key size of 1537536 bits. For the sake of comparison, we
consider from Table 3 the GRS code with n = 546, k = 396, defined over F547,
which achieves the security level 2137.6 for z = 1. This value remains higher
than 2128 even when considering the improvement estimated in Section 5.2 for
possible advances in ISD algorithms over non-binary fields.
By adopting this code in the Niederreiter version of the first implementation
(see Section 3.2), and storing the last k columns of H′′, defined by (10), we
obtain a public key size of 540267 bits, that is about 65% less than in the
revised McEliece/Niederreiter cryptosystem based on binary Goppa codes [11].
If we compare this solution with the non-binary Goppa codes proposed in [13],
defined over fields ranging between F3 and F32, we get a public key size reduction
ranging between 24% and 68% (we also note that in [13] no improvement over the
approach [40] was taken into account). Also in this case, we choosem = 1+ r−3n
and, hence, the distinguisher attack is avoided even when z = 1.
5.3.3 Impact of variable z
The value of z plays a role in the ISD WF computation, as mentioned in Section
5.2. So, it is meaningful to analyze the impact of increasing the value of z, under
different assumptions for m. Similarly to what done before for z = 1, we can
estimate the WF of an ISD attack for different values of z. Results for z = 2, 3, 4
are reported in Tables 3 and 4.
As we can observe from the tables, a WF decrease in the order of 23 or
less occurs each time z is increased by 1. So, for the considered parameters,
the security level undergoes some variation, as expected. It should be noted,
however, that such an approach is very conservative. To increase both m and
z is an unfavorable condition from the key size standpoint since, reducing the
number of correctable intentional errors, it forces the user to increase the error
correction capability, by increasing the code length or reducing the code rate.
Generalizing the analysis in Section 5.1.2, that is valid for m = 1, a lower
bound on the complexity of the DAP can be estimated in k3q3z operations and,
for a given k, this value increases by q3 for any increase of z by 1. Hence, it is
possible to verify that, with m = 1 and z ≥ 2, the DAP has WF ≥ 280 when
q ≥ 401, while, for smaller q, z ≥ 3 is needed. More complex analyses could be
developed to improve the mentioned lower bound, which, however, are outside
the goals of the present paper.
Moreover, we notice that increasing z also has detrimental effects on com-
plexity, as we will show in Section 6. Hence, it is preferable to make DAPs
unfeasible by choosing m > 1, rather than z > 1.
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6 Key size and complexity
In this section, we compare the key length and complexity of the proposed
system with those of the classical Goppa code-based cryptosystem and of the
RSA algorithm. We refer to the Niederreiter version of both the proposed
cryptosystem and of the Goppa code-based solution.
As regards the key length, as already observed, the key of the proposed
system is a k × r matrix of elements in Fq. The same holds for the Goppa
code-based Niederreiter cryptosystem, with the only difference that the matrix
entries are binary, while for RSA the key length can be estimated as twice the
block size, that is, 2n [14].
As regards the complexity, we must decide the convention for measuring the
number of operations. According to [15], we consider the cost S of one addition
between elements of Fq to be equal to l = ⌈log2(q)⌉ binary operations, while
the cost M of one multiplication equals that of 2l additions, that is, M = 2l2
binary operations. Following [15], we also consider that an inversion over Fq
has the same cost as a multiplication, that is, M binary operations.
The right (or left, respectively) multiplication of an x×y matrix by a vector
having w non-null elements requires to sum w columns (or rows, respectively) of
the matrix, which costs as (w− 1)xS (or (w− 1)yS, respectively) binary opera-
tions. When working over Fq with q > 2, this quantity must be added with the
operations needed to multiply each element of the vector by the corresponding
matrix column (or row, respectively), that is, further wxM (or wyM, respec-
tively) binary operations. Actually, if the matrix is random, we can consider
that each column (or row, respectively) has, on average, xq (or
y
q , respectively)
null elements. Hence, computing the element-wise sum or product requires, on
average, x q−1q (or y
q−1
q , respectively) sums or multiplications. For the sake of
simplicity, we neglect the term q−1q , thus obtaining slightly pessimistic evalua-
tions.
In the Niederreiter cryptosystem, encryption consists in computing (9). If we
consider the systematic version of the key (10) and split the vector e into its left
and right parts, e = [el|er], the encryption function becomes x = e
T
l +H
′′
r ·e
T
r .
Considering, as in [14], that on average er has weight equal to w =
k
n tpub,
the encryption step requires [(w − 1)r + tpub − w]S binary operations when
working over F2. More precisely, (w − 1)r sums come from the computation
of H′′r · e
T
r , and further tpub − w sums come from the addition of e
T
l . When
working over Fq, with q > 2, the number of binary operations becomes [(w −
1)r+ tpub −w]S +wrM. Here we do not consider the encoding step needed to
map the information vector into a constant weight vector (and, then, to demap
it), which gives a negligible contribution to the total complexity.
Concerning the decryption stage, we refer to the standard GRS syndrome
decoding algorithm, whose complexity can be easily estimated in closed form
[15]. This provides a worst-case estimation, since fast implementations exist
which are able to achieve significant complexity reductions [15]. Additional
gains can also be obtained by novel techniques as in [20], [45]. The complexity
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of the main steps of GRS syndrome decoding can be estimated [15] in: i) 4t(2t+
2)M+ 2t(2t+ 1)S binary operations for the the key equation solver, ii) n(t−
1)M+ntS binary operations for the Chien search, and iii) (2t2+t)M+t(2t−1)S
binary operations for Forney’s formula. Here we do not consider the syndrome
computation step, since the ciphertext is already computed as a syndrome in
the Niederreiter cryptosystem.
The Niederreiter cryptosystem also needs to compute the product S · x.
Since x is a random r × 1 vector over Fq, we can consider it has, at most,
weight r. So, computing S · x requires further (r−1)rS binary operations when
working over F2 and (r− 1)rS + r
2M binary operations when working over Fq,
with q > 2.
The system we propose replaces the permutation matrix with a denser trans-
formation matrix, hence Bob must compute eT = T
T ·eT , which requires further
(t− 1)nS binary operations when working over F2 and (t− 1)nS + tnM binary
operations when working over Fq, with q > 2. Furthermore, the proposed sys-
tem requires to perform the guessing stage described in Section 3. In fact, Bob
needs to guess the value of z elements of Fq. We want to stress that there is no
need to execute all of the standard decoding operations in decoding the guessed
vector; in fact, there is a very high probability that, if the guessed value is
wrong, the word we are trying to decode is indeed not decodable at all. In this
case, the first step of the decoding algorithm, that is the key equation solving
algorithm, ends with an error, and it is useless to continue through the decoding
process. So, only the key equation solver has to be attempted multiple times,
while the algorithms to find the roots of the locator polynomial and the value of
each error are to be executed only once. In addition, according to (17) and (21),
each guessing attempt requires to perform at most r multiplications and r sums
between elements of Fq (the vectorsH · b
T andH · 1T can be precomputed only
once, before decryption).
Based on the considerations above, the overall decryption complexity for the
Niederreiter version of the proposed cryptosystem can be estimated as:
DGRS =
{
[4t(2t+ 2) + r] q
z
2 + 2t
2 + (2n+ 1)t+ r2 − n
}
M
+
{
[2t(2t+ 1) + r] q
z
2 + 2t
2 + (2n− 1)t+ (r − 1)r − n
}
S,
(25)
where the term q
z
2 is given by the mean number of attempts needed to find the
right guessed set of z values.
In [14], an estimation of the decryption complexity for the Goppa code-based
Niederreiter cryptosystem can be found. It results in:
DGoppa = n+ 4g
2t2 + 2g2t+ gn(2t+ 1) +
r2
2
, (26)
where g = log2(n).
The complexity values estimated so far are expressed in terms of binary
operations needed to encrypt or decrypt one ciphertext. We are more interested
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in computing the complexity per information bit, thus we divide them by the
number of information bits per ciphertext, that is, log2
[(
n
tpub
)
(q − 1)tpub
]
.
A comparison among the proposed system, the binary Goppa code-based
Niederreiter algorithm and RSA (whose complexity has been also evaluated in
[14]) is shown in Table 5, for the same parameters considered in Example 2 of
Section 5.3. The complexity values are given per information bit and the key
length is expressed in bits. The ciphertext and cleartext size (which coincide
with n and k, respectively) are expressed in bits for the binary Goppa code-
based Niederreiter and RSA schemes, while they are in q-ary symbols for the
proposed GRS code-based solution.
Table 5: Comparison between the binary Goppa code-based Niederreiter cryp-
tosystem, RSA and the proposed GRS code-based cryptosystem for 128-bit
security.
Binary Goppa code-based RSA GRS code-based
Niederreiter proposed
n 2960 3072 546
k 2288 3072 396
Key size 1537536 6144 540267
Enc. complexity 72 5406 1679
Dec. complexity 15302 6643013 3228153
These results point out that the proposed cryptosystem can be seen as a
tradeoff between the classical binary Goppa code-based Niederreiter cryptosys-
tem and RSA. In fact, it is able to reduce the key size, by about three times, with
respect to the binary Goppa code-based solution. This comes at some cost in
complexity, which, however, remains lower than for the widely used RSA. More
in detail, the encoding and decoding complexities of the proposed cryptosystem
are, respectively, more than three and two times smaller than for RSA.
7 Conclusion
We have introduced a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem that, by replacing
the secret permutation matrix with a more general transformation matrix, is
able to avoid that the public code is permutation-equivalent to the secret code.
This allows to prevent attacks against classical families of codes, like GRS codes,
and to reconsider them as possible good candidates in this framework.
We have proposed some practical implementations of the new cryptosys-
tem, by considering both its McEliece and Niederreiter variants, and we have
addressed some important issues that may influence their design.
We have also assessed the security level of the proposed cryptosystem, by
considering up-to-date attack procedures, and we have compared it with the
classical McEliece cryptosystem and the Niederreiter variant. Our results show
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that the proposed solution, by exploiting GRS codes, is able to guarantee an
increased security level and, at the same time, a considerable reduction in the
public key size. Moreover, for a given security level, the proposed solution
exhibits lower complexity than RSA.
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